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ABSTRACT 
Domain names and the Domain Name System (DNS) are essential to the 
Internet, but unfortunately cyber-criminals also make use of these to fulfil 
their nefarious agenda and gain illicit profit. In this work we survey known 
forms of domain and DNS abuse from the criminal business point of view. 
We relate this to abusive techniques, which we also survey. Based on the 
theoretical understanding of the abusive techniques, we devise a set of 
practical heuristics for recognising said techniques. This enables a focused 
and efficient manual analysis of heuristically ranked domains, with the goal 
of identifying abusive domains. As the .dk Country  Code Top-Level 
Domain has received little scrutiny in the past, but is believed to see only 
limited abuse, it represents a relevant and presumably challenging case for 
identifying abuse, and we therefore use it for evaluation.  WHOIS data is 
collected for 10.000 second level domains for 66 days, heuristics are 
applied, and the resulting rankings guide a manual vetting. Our findings are 
that with automated heuristics we can limit the manual investigative effort 
to hours, and still identify 5 domains which are actively abused during our 
observation period.  
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
As links between the cyber and physical realms have grown in numbers and 
strength, the potential profit and impact of cybercrime has grown too. 
Domain names are a prime example of this, as businesses, organisations, 
and private persons use domain names not only for technical administrative 
purposes, but also very much for branding themselves on the Internet. As 
domain names and the Domain Name System (DNS) are ubiquitous, cyber 
criminals have naturally found it useful too, both for technical purposes and 
especially due to it being trusted by users and organisations. 
One example of cybercrime involving domains is phishing, where attackers 
pretend to be a trustworthy third party and lure the victim into disclosing 
confidential information such a credentials, which can be exploited for 
profit. In phishing schemes, it is common to use domain names mimicking 
the third party to gain the trust of the victim. This type of attack targets the 
discrepancies between human fuzzy interpretation of domain names and the 
exact mapping provided by DNS. It can be combined with similar 
techniques, such as mimicking visual identity and logos, which are not 
pertaining to DNS and domain names. In addition to these human-targeted 
techniques there are also examples of abuse that are purely technical. Just 
like legitimate organisations rely on the DNS infrastructure, so do the 
criminals. This can be observed when bots or other malware attempt to 
establish a Command and Control (CnC) channel from compromised victim 
machines to the attacker, when spam emails are sent, or when scam web 
shops present themselves like ordinary, legitimate web shops. There are 
many more examples of how domain names and DNS can be abused, but we 
defer a more extensive survey to Section 2. 
The global losses caused by cybercrime in 2017 have been estimated by 
Lewis (2018) to be between 445 and 608 billion USD, while McGuire 
(2018) estimated the annual global revenue for cybercrime to be 1.5 trillion 
USD. Given the size of the cybercriminal underground economy, it is clear 
that it is beneficial for the criminals to specialise in different roles. 
Examples of such roles include finding exploits, writing malware, infecting 
victims, operating CnC infrastructure, and laundering money (Sood, Bansal, 
and Enbody, 2013). While the individuals of a group of criminals can 
specialise accordingly, the reality is that criminals even specialise to the 
extent that they provide their services on well-established underground 
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markets. Pay Per Install (PPI) is an example of this, where the operators of 
botnets sell or rent access to victim machines. Another example is how 
credentials and personal information are traded on well-organised 
underground and online marketplaces, where customer satisfaction is 
ensured by providing merchant ratings and escrow services. As a final 
example, malware and exploit kits come nicely packaged with 24/7 phone 
support. 
These phenomena are clearly undesirable for the general, law abiding 
society, so luckily there are means to counter them. As already exemplified, 
cybercrime relies extensively on  domain names and DNS, which therefore 
is an interesting means for solving the problem. Victims can defend 
themselves with blacklists of bad domains and with detection methods based 
on both heuristic algorithms and data driven machine learning. An 
alternative, complementary approach is for the registries operating Top-
Level Domains (TLD), such as .com or .dk, and related DNS infrastructure, 
to block queries or reject registrations for abusive domains. The registries 
are not necessarily impacted directly by abuse, but if a TLD is widely and 
commonly abused, the reputation is impacted negatively, and thereby also 
the value of the products offered by the registry. Furthermore, there are legal 
aspects that motivate registries. Registries are thus both capable and 
motivated to combat abuse.  
Our primary contributions are a method to heuristically rank domains, such 
that manual effort invested towards identifying abusive domains can be used 
efficiently, and the first published scientific study on abuse in the .dk TLD. 
We also contribute with an overview of malicious techniques, with 
heuristics motivated by an understanding of the techniques, and with the 
detailed results of applying the heuristics.  
In Section 2 we survey different types of abuse, with an outset in the 
business models and the criminal economy in which the abuses took place. 
Based on these types of abuses we identify malicious techniques used by the 
criminals in relation to domain names and DNS. In Section 3 we apply the 
insights into the techniques to develop a set of heuristics for identifying 
domains where the techniques are applied. We collect data for a subset of 
the .dk country code TLD and apply the heuristics to search for abusive 
second-level domains (2LD), with Section 4 describing the outcome. We 
offer our interpretation of the results in Section 5 describe the future 
direction in Section 6 and conclude on the current study in Section 7  
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 2  BACKGROUND 
In this Section we survey abuse from a criminal business perspective, 
identifying different schemes, with clear links to how domain names are 
abused, and how the illicit profit is generated. This is followed by a survey 
of techniques that enables or improves the schemes. The distinction between 
schemes and techniques is important, because schemes allow us to 
understand the motivation of the criminals, while understanding of the 
techniques enables us to look for technical artefacts that can be searched for 
at a large scale. 
Abuse Schemes 
Phishing has already been described in the Introduction as a scheme where 
criminals rely on luring victims into disclosing confidential information. In 
this scheme the business model can be as simple as: Register a domain 
similar to the trusted third party, e-mail victim(s) misleading instructions, 
and receive credentials from the victims that succumb to the attack. 
Obtaining victim e-mail addresses, sending large amounts of phishing 
emails, and exploiting the results can be delegated, hence the criminal value 
added in phishing comes from tricking users. It is relevant to discern 
between 0-day phishing domains registered with intentions of abuse and 
compromised phishing domains that are registered with good intentions, but 
later compromised by criminals and abused for phishing (Moura, Müller, 
Davids, Wullink, and Hesselman, 2017). 0-day phishing domains should 
ideally be detected before registration, or briefly thereafter, as criminals 
register, exploit, and discard domains rapidly (Hao, Thomas, Paxson, 
Feamster, Kreibich, Grier, and Hollenbeck, 2013). Registries are challenged 
when it comes to addressing abuse with compromised domains without 
involving the registrant owning the domain, as any action by the registry 
will likely interfere with legitimate use of the domain. On the other hand, 
involving the rightful, exploited registrant can be slow and time consuming. 
E-mail spam is the well-known malpractice of sending bulk, unsolicited e-
mails, where profit can be made, for instance, by infecting victims (PPI), or 
through ads and referrals to dubious web shops (Kanich, Kreibich, 
Levchenko, Enright, Voelker, Paxson, and Savage, 2008). While the 
problem is well known, there is plenty of evidence that the abuse of domain 
names for spamming has not been handled yet (Hao, Thomas, Paxson, 
Feamster, Kreibich, Grier, and Hollenbeck, 2013).  
Scam web shops use domain names for landing customers, just like 
legitimate web shops, but the shipped goods might be counterfeit, if it is 
even shipped at all, and the customer credit card details might be stored and 
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abused (Abbasi and Chen, 2009). If the criminals accept payments but never 
ship the goods, or ship cheaper counterfeits, they profit. If the consumer is 
knowingly buying counterfeit goods, the criminals are profiting from 
facilitating the illicit trading of counterfeit goods. In all cases, domain name 
abuse enables illicit profit. 
Domain parking is the practice of registering a domain without developing it 
and without providing genuine content, but rather redirecting traffic to a 
parking service, which generates generic content, typically advertisements, 
in order to monetise from users who, by mistake, point their web browser to 
the domain (Vissers, Joosen, and Nikiforakis, 2015). Parking is clearly not 
aligned with the users’ intent, but as stated by Moura et al. (2017), it is not 
necessarily illegal, hence it can make sense to distinguish between legal 
parking with ads and illegal, malicious parking, where users are diverted to 
scams, exploits, or other attacks. In either case the revenue stems from 
selling redirections of users, regardless of the user’s intentions. 
Web spam is a scheme that lends itself to e-mail spamming, as it uses a bulk 
of useless or misleading content, but instead of distributing this via e-mail it 
presents itself as web pages (Gyöngyi and Garcia-Molina, 2005). Abusing 
multiple domains to host content that refers to each other only, the criminals 
seek to entrap search engine web crawlers and boost their own malicious 
content into search results, which is why this is also referred to as Blackhat 
Search Engine Optimisation (Moura et al., 2017). Profit comes from serving 
victims with ads or malicious content. While this form of abuse is fully 
dependent on domain name abuse, it is obvious that search providers also 
have motivation and options to combat this. 
Botnet CnC can abuse domain names as rendezvous points, where victim 
machines infected with bot malware can reach the bot master’s 
infrastructure. With an established CnC channel, the bot master obtains 
scalable remote control and data exfiltration capabilities, which can enable 
other schemes, including harvesting of banking credentials or credit card 
details, sending of e-mail spam, or PPI. 
 
Abuse Techniques 
Mimicking is a technique intended to make the human victim confuse a 
malicious domain for a legitimate and trusted third party. This can be 
achieved with slight alterations from the third-party domain name, e.g. 
barely noticeable spelling errors, minor edits, insertion of hyphens, 
substitution with homoglyphs (I.e. similar looking characters), and more. 
Attackers can both use mimicking domains actively, e.g. when sending 
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targets phishing e-mails, and passively, such as with typosquatting where 
attackers rely on victims to mistype a domain name, so they end up at a 
parked domain.  
Malicious re-registration, also known as drop catching, is when an attacker 
registers an expired domain for abuse. Browser bookmarks, hyperlinks, 
user-remembered domain names, residual search engine results, based on 
the previous content, and general system configurations rarely reflect that a 
domain has expired. Instead trust in a domain persists if it re-registered by a 
criminal. Users browsing the web can be redirected to parking services, bot-
infected victims can be re-enrolled by a new botmaster, and DNS 
infrastructure can be hijacked just like any account recoverable through an 
e-mail address in the domain (Lever, Walls, Nadji, Dagon, McDaniel, and 
Antonakakis, 2016). 
Bulk registration refers to the practice of registering many domain names in 
bulk. While Hao et al. (2013) described how e-mail spammers employ this 
technique, it is clearly relevant for web spammers too, and also when 
employing Domain Flux (See below). The motivation for criminals to do 
bulk registrations lies in the convenience and scalability, and in the 
discounts offered by registrars. 
Fluxing refers to a collection of techniques that abuse the capabilities of 
DNS to make the criminal’s infrastructure more resilient to take-downs 
and/or harder to track, investigate, and block. Fast Flux is the first variant, 
where a domain name maps to many IP addresses that all provide identical 
service or content, possibly by proxying, with the mappings changing 
rapidly (Holz, Gorecki, Rieck, and Freiling, 2008). The benefit for the 
attacker is that forensic analysis on the victim only provides one of the 
many redundant IPs, that IP might only point to another victim unknowingly 
proxying for the attacker, and all this information is rapidly outdated. This 
thwart blacklisting and take-down efforts. 
Double Flux extends Fast Flux by also applying the same approach to how 
authoritative name servers are found (Fast Flux applies to A records in 
DNS. Double Flux applies to NS records.) (Nazario and Holz, 2008).  
Domain Fluxing can be seen as the inverse of the above: Fast Flux and 
Double Flux enables a domain name to point to many IP addresses. With 
Domain Flux, a large set of domain names can be used to point to a single 
IP. This is achieved with Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) that 
produce large sets of pseudorandom domain names, of which the attacker 
can chose to register any one to establish a CnC channel (Porras, Saidi, and 
Yegneswaran, 2009), (Schiavoni, Maggi, Cavallaro, and Zanero, 2014). 
This makes it infeasible to block or sink-hole all the domains. 
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RELATED WORK 
An empirical study of spammers advertising for scam web shops, focusing 
on the value chain for the criminal operation has been conducted by 
Levchenko, Pitsillidis, Chachra, Enright, Félegyházi, Grier, ... and McCoy 
(2011), providing the insight that payment processor represents a bottleneck 
and thereby an interesting point for disrupting the illicit business. This study 
is different to ours in that it goes towards the physical realm, studying the 
criminal business operations extensively. This clearly has benefits, but also 
some drawbacks, such as the ethical issue of completing business with the 
criminals, the inertia of operations (e.g. shipping), and poorer scalability 
compared to the cyber realm. Our proposal does not require business 
interactions, can be conducted with the speed and scale common to the 
cyber realm, and spans more forms of abuse. 
A study on abuse in generic TLDs (gTLDs) was presented by Korczynski, 
Wullink, Tajalizadehkhoob, Moura, and Hesselman (2017), with an 
emphasis on how abuse differs between legacy and new gTLDs. In contrast, 
our work is concerned with a country-code TLD (ccTLD). Data used in their 
study included WHOIS information, blacklists, DNS zone file, and active 
measurements, whereas our study only relies on WHOIS data for the 
heuristics. Their observations indicated that with the emergence of new 
gTLDs, abusive registrations have shifted from the legacy to the new 
gTLDs. A strong concentration within particular new gTLDs was observed, 
while no proof of abuse was found for some new gTLDs. As criminals have 
demonstrated the ability to migrate to domains better meeting their 
demands, it is important to study different TLDs, including ccTLDs, to 
understand if and how abuse differs. 
Korczyński, Tajalizadehkhoob, Noroozian, Wullink, Hesselman, and Eeten 
(2017) also presented a study on “badness” across TLDs, taking both the 
number of domains found in blacklists and the time until cases of abuse 
were remediated into account. In this study it was found that abuse was a 
more significant problem for large gTLDs and less so for new gTLDs, when 
considering the size of the domains. Abuse was found to be correlated with 
domain pricing models, DNSSECi deployment rates, and strict registration 
policies. These findings suggest that the varying traits of TLDs affect the 
prevalence of abuse, making it relevant to analyse specific TLDs in depth.  
Another example of how specific practices in a given TLD can impact abuse 
can be found in the work of Lauinger, Chaabane, Buyukkayhan, Onarlioglu, 
and Robertson (2017), who explored “questionable practices” related to re-
registrations in legacy gTLDs. These practices are strongly coupled with the 
registration processes that differ among TLDs. 
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Finally, we point to a prior study into a specific ccTLD, namely .eu, 
conducted by Vissers, Spooren, Agten, Jumpertz, Janssen, Wesemael, ... and 
Desmet (2017). Information on registrations for 14 months was compared to 
blacklists, and blacklisted domains was analysed manually. The authors 
attributed 80.04 % of the abusive registrations to 20 campaigns. This 
demonstrates how analysis of domains registered within a ccTLD can 
provide insight into the activities of cybercriminals. 
 
 3  METHODS 
With a solid understanding of abuse from the preceding surveys of schemes 
and techniques, we now move on, towards a method for identifying abuse. 
The goal is to efficiently identify abusive domain names. First, we reason 
for an approach of applying heuristics to domain names, as they can be 
applied at scale. We then present a set of concrete heuristics that can be used 
to rank domains by how likely it is that they are employing specific 
techniques. Finally, we describe an approach for manual vetting, which can 
be applied to the domains that are ranked the highest by the heuristics. By 
relying on heuristics to focus the manual effort where it is most likely to 
provide positive identification of abuse, we seek to optimise our method to 
identify domains that require action, with manual capacity as the 
constraining resource. 
We observe that domain names are a frequent component among the 
surveyed schemes, and a component of all the techniques. This implies that 
domains have substantial potential for abuse, but also that analysis of 
domain names can provide insights to multiple forms of abuse, and that 
mitigations based on domain names can have serious impact on criminal 
activity. At the same time domain names can be processed as purely digital 
entities at a scale and speed that is significantly higher than if the analysis 
was to also encompass the criminal activities in the physical world. 
When analysing abusive domains, a known problem is that the set of 
abusive domains is not clearly isolated in the set of all domains. This is 
caused by criminals having the choice to register any free domain, and at the 
same time they are naturally interested in blending in with legitimate 
registrations, to improve their chances of success.  
A common practice is to rely on blacklist as a mechanism to identify 
abusive domains. This has the benefit of being a practical solution to the 
problem, but it relies on the blacklists to be correct, and it does not provide 
for identifying abusive domains that were not previously blacklisted. 
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Furthermore, different blacklists often target different types of abuse, based 
on vaguely defined or unspecified criteria, making them difficult to 
understand. An additional concern is the extensive discrepancies between 
blacklists, which adds to the ambiguity. In this work, we define domain 
abuse as any use that violates accepted terms, applicable law, or the non-
conflicting interest of non-criminal users of the Internet. 
We analyse domains from blacklists as well as domains sampled randomly 
from the relevant zone-file, thereby providing insights on the zone and not 
just on the blacklisted part of it. 
We hypothesize that given a solid understanding of the abusive techniques, 
and of the technical aspects of DNS and domain names, it is possible to 
describe artefacts of the techniques, which in turn enables us to define 
heuristics that can be applied automatically and at scale to highlight 
domains that are likely abusive, such that they can be subjected to deeper 
manual vetting process to identify abusive domains.  
Data collection 
This study is enabled by a unique access to information from the .dk zone, 
specifically a list of all 2LDs. Previous studies on abuse are largely focussed 
on .com and .net, with some other TLDs also receiving some attention, but 
this is to the best of our knowledge the first published study of different 
forms of abuse in the .dk TLD.  
To gather sufficient details for identifying as many forms of abuse as 
possible the list of domain names is enriched with a data from the public 
WHOIS serviceii. The .dk WHOIS service applies a rate limit of 1 query per 
second, meaning that collecting data for all .dk 2LDs would take weeks. As 
abuse for a given domain might be limited to hours or days this poses a 
problem. We solve this by limiting our study to 10.000 domains. First, to 
increase the likelihood of finding abuse, we use all .dk 2LDs found in a set 
of 31 retrievable, public blacklists (Kidmose et al, 2018), as we have higher 
expectancy of these being abused. Second, we sample the list of all .dk 
2LDs up to 10.000 total domains. For our subset of .dk domains we collect 
WHOIS data once a day. This strikes a balance between coverage of the 
zone and frequency of updates, given the boundaries of the rate limit. 
Heuristics 
Mimicking domains are intended to look similar to other domains, hence our 
heuristic for this is targeting similarity. Similarity can be expressed in many 
ways, but as domain names are essentially text strings it is obvious to apply 
the Levenshtein distance, which describes the minimum number of edits that 
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transforms one string to another (Moore and Edelman, 2010). Clearly the 
similarity measure needs to be applied to a potentially mimicking domain 
and a potential target domain. For target domains we expect that criminal 
focus on popular domains, as they are more likely to impact a larger group 
of victims. Consequently, our evaluation uses the Alexa top 1 million of 
popular domain names as targets. We analyse both 2LD labels, such as the 
example part of example.dk and the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)  
of the .dk domains against the 2LD label and FQDN, as the TLD might and 
might not be part of the mimicry. We expect small editing distances for 
longer labels/domains to be less likely to occur naturally, meaning they are 
more interesting if they occur, so we normalise editing distance by 
label/domain length.  
Malicious re-registration occurs very rapidly according to Lauinger, 
Chaabane, Buyukkayhan, Onarlioglu, and Robertson (2017). While their 
study is subject to the specific conditions for the .com domain, the logical 
reasoning is generally applicable. Hence, our heuristic for malicious re-
registrations is to select the re-registrations that follows the closest after 
deletion for further inspection. 
Double flux is defined as a domain having rapidly changing nameservers, so 
our heuristic is to rank domains by how frequent the set of nameserver 
hostnames change in the WHOIS data. 
Domain Flux relies on DGA’s to generate domains that appear 
pseudorandom, as seen in the examples provided by Schiavoni et al., (2014). 
Our heuristic is the entropy of the distribution of letters within the 2LD 
labels, which is expected to be high when the letters are pseudo-randomly 
distributed. 
Manual vetting 
For each of the above heuristics we obtain a ranked list of most likely 
abusive domains (Based on the heuristic). Given the lack of ground truth, 
the top ranked domains are vetted manually, based on the following 
procedure. 
Additional information on the domain is retrieved. This includes any 
homepage hosted via HTTP(S). The domain is checked against a more 
extensive set of blacklistsiii, including some that are query-only and not 
retrievable in full. If the registrant appears to be a Danish company, the 
official Central Business Registry (CVR) is queriediv, as for instance 
missing records are highly suspicious, while long-lived companies are 
assumed to be less prone to register a domain for abuse. The google search 
engine is queried for the 2LD and the first 10 results are inspected for any 
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obvious relations to abuse. Finally, the history of WHOIS data is inspected 
for any content or change that could be relevant to understand if the domain 
is abused. 
 
 4  RESULTS 
The following describes the details of the data collection operation, the 
results of applying heuristics, and the outcome of the subsequent manual 
vetting. In summary, the heuristics based on editing distance extracted 78 
domains which were vetted manually, leading to the conclusion that 5 were 
actively abused during our observation period, while 22 were cases of 
defensive registrations. The manual vetting took approximately 4 hours. 
Data collection 
In accordance with the data collection procedure described in the previous 
section, 269 .dk domains were found on the monitored blacklists, and the 
remaining 9.731 domains were selected at random among all .dk domains. 
The WHOIS information for these 10.000 domain was retrieved once a day 
from March 23rd, 2018 to May 29th, 2018 (66 days).  
 
Figure 1: Number  of daily updated records. 
Figure 1 shows the number of changed WHOIS records per day. A spike at 
the end of April and the beginning of May was caused by a failure where the 
records for some domains were flapping to and from empty. Figure 2 
represents the same information but cleaned for this error. The cause has not 
been identified, but as evident from Figure 2 most records resumed the same 
value after said incident. The WHOIS data for 9.051 domains was 
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unaffected, of the 949 affected domains, 846 domains saw exactly one 
failure, and six was the highest number of failures for any domain. 
 
Figure 2: Number of daily updated records with empty results removed. 
Editing distance: .dk 2LD labels against Alexa 2LD labels 
The editing distances between the 10.000 2LD labels from .dk and the 
888.876 unique 2LD labels from Alexa were naturally 0 for the 554 labels 
that was present in both. As lower editing distance is more interesting, we 
prioritised to analyse these 554. The 2LDs in .dk corresponding to 12 of 
these labels were never active during our observation period, so they were 
ignored. Reasons for this inactivity was that they expired before our 
observation, meaning they were observed as “Deactivated” in WHOIS for a 
while before disappearing, or that the registration never completed, leaving 
them in a “Reserved” state. In either case, they were not in the .dk zone, and 
not resolvable via DNS, could not have been abused, and therefore they 
were ignored. Of the remaining 542 labels, the corresponding .dk 2LD for 
506 labels had been registered for more than a year, which is the minimum 
registration period. This contradicted the expectation that the period of 
active abuse is short, so these were ignored, in order to focus on the 
remaining 36 domains. For 34 domains the manual vetting procedure 
yielded no indications of abuse. For one label, which coincides with a 
British menswear brand, the <LABEL>.com 2LD was found in Alexa and 
was registered to the company behind the brand, but <LABEL>.dk was 
registered to an individual with no apparent affiliation to the brand, and the 
domain is parked (The authoritative nameservers were at sedoparking.com). 
This appeared to be a parked, cybersquatted domain. The remaining one 
label was related to online marketing, and a marketing company owned the 
Alexa-listed <LABEL>.com.  The <LABEL>.dk domain was to expire 
between the end of observations and the time of writing. It was not listed in 
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WHOIS at the time of writing but was still reported as a phishing domain by 
Fortinetv. The Internet Archivevi has a single capture during the suspicious 
registration period, which shows a minimal frontpage consisting of nothing 
but some JavaScript and an iframe. It appeared very likely that this was a 
domain abused for phishing. 
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE 554 2LD LABELS FOUND IN BOTH THE 10.000 .DK 
DOMAINS AND IN THE ALEXA TOP 1 MILLION. FILTERED DOMAINS HAVE NOT 
BEEN SUBJECT TO MANUAL VETTING, BECAUSE THEY WERE NEVER OBSERVED AS 
ACTIVE OR WERE OBSERVED AS ACTIVE FOR +1 YEAR. 
 # 2LD labels  
Never active (Filtered) 12 
Active for +1 year (Filtered) 506 
Manually vetted 36 
 
In summary, comparing 2LD labels, ignoring inactive and long-lived 
domains, we manually analysed 36 domains, and found two domains that 
were likely seeing active abuse. One was a parked cybersquatting of a 
domain related to a menswear brand. The other had suspicious content and 
was blacklisted as a phishing site.  
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF ABUSIVE DOMAIN FOUND BY COMPARING 2LD LABELS 
AND SUBSEQUENT MANUAL VETTING. 
 # 2LDs 
Cybersquatting brand/web shop, parked 1 
Phishing 1 
 
Editing distance: .dk 2LD FQDNs against Alexa FQDNs 
The normalised editing distance between FDQNs highlighted 31 .dk 
domains as they were also found in Alexa, resulting in a distance of zero. 
This is of course not abuse and these were filtered out. Subsequently, we 
manually analysed the 50 pairs of .dk and Alexa FQDN’s that were closest, 
without being exact matches. Seven of the top 50 pairs were the legitimate 
domain triumphmotorcycles.dk paired with the same 2LD label in .de, .be, 
.ch, .es, .fr, .in, and .it TLDs. Similarly, three pairs were the legitimate 
blogspot.dk paired with the .de, .mk, and .sk variants.  
For all 50 pairs, we subjected the 2LD from .dk to our manual vetting 
process, with the following results. Data on the Alexa domain from the same 
sources was also considered where relevant. 20 domains appeared to be used 
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for hosting legitimate websites of enterprises, smaller companies, and 
private persons, with no suspicion raised through the manual vetting 
process. 22 domains appeared to be defensive registrations by the owners of 
the corresponding Alexa domain, either redirecting accordingly or parked 
with an apparently conscientious, add-free provider. Of these 22, 14 where 
defensive registrations for other .dk domains, six where for domains in the 
.de TLD, and remaining two are those pertaining to blogspot label as 
mentioned above. 
For three of the 50 pairs, the .dk 2LD was registered, was not found to be 
related to abuse, nor did we find any indication that it was actively used, e.g. 
with a webpage or Google results that include an e-mail address at the 
domain. These domains appeared to be unused.  
A summary of the non-abusive domains captured by the normalised editing 
distance between FQDNs is as follows: 20 domains seeing ordinary use, 22 
cases of defensive registrations, and three passive domains.  
One of the 42 .dk 2LD domains (50 pairs, 42 unique .dk domains) was found 
to be close to a service for price comparison service also in .dk, but with no 
apparent affiliation, and with the domain parked with parkingcrew.net. We 
strongly suspect this to be a typosquatting domain that was active in the 
period of our study, and still was at the time of writing. Two other pairs 
were cases of the .dk FQDN being similar to a .de, with 2LD labels 
matching, while the .dk domains redirected to parking services. We believe 
these two was typo-squatted domains,  that monetized through parking. 
Finally, we also found one domain that was close to a domain with outdoor 
lifestyle content and a web shop. The suspected domain had been seized by 
authorities prior to our observations, the Internet Archive has records of a 
web shop which appeared highly suspicious, and it was blacklisted by Web 
of Trustvii as a scam/counterfeit web shop. 
 
TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF PAIRS WITH LOW EDITING DISTANCE (LEVENSHTEIN) 
BETWEEN ONE OF 10.000 .DK 2LD DOMAINS AND A FQDN FROM THE ALEXA 
TOP 1 MILLION. RIGHTHAND COLUMN LIST COUNT OF UNIQUE 2LDS FROM .DK. 
WHERE RELEVANT NUMBER OF UNIQUE PAIRS ARE LISTED IN PARENTHESIS. 
NOTE THAT A .DK DOMAIN CAN BE IN MULTIPLE PAIRS.  
 # Unique 2LDs 
(pairs)  
Manually vetted 42 (50) 
Legitimate use (excluding defensive) 20 
Defensive registrations    
(22) 
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- Defensive, paired with Alexa domain 
from*.dk 
8 (8) 
- Defensive, paired with Alexa domain 
from *.de 
6 (6) 
- Defensive, paired with Alexa domain 
from *.mk or *.sk 
1 (2) 
Not in use 3 
Typosquatting of price comparison service, 
parked 
1 
Typosquatting (.de vs. .dk) 2 
Typosquatting (web shop, 
Seized prior to our study) 
1 
 
Reregistration and High Entropy 
Among the 10.000 domains that was observed, three were successfully 
reregistered during our 66 days observation period, with lags of 14, 15, and 
152 days respectively. We found no evidence of abuse and assume all cases 
to be legitimate registrations.  
For the 50 domains that had the highest entropy, we found no indications of 
active abuse. One domain had previously been seized by the authorities, but 
before our observations started, and due to trademark infringements and 
scams, which appears unrelated to the entropy. All of the 50 domains 
appeared human readable.  
 
 5  DISCUSSION 
We were able to apply theory about how criminals operate their business 
and what techniques they use to devise heuristics that automatically can 
prioritise domains for manual scrutiny. In the case of the Levenshtein 
editing distance as a heuristic for identifying the mimicking technique the 
automated procedures processed 10.000 domains and prioritised 78 
domains. 36 of these domains were identified as 2LD labels that were found 
in both .dk and Alexa. 42 of these were identified as unique .dk FQDNS that 
was in the top 50 of similar FQDN pairs, compared to Alexa FQDNs. The 
discrepancy between the total of 78 domains and contributions of 42 plus 50 
stems from the intersection between the two contributions. Among the 72 
domains, we are confident that five domains were being actively abused 
during our observation period: Four cases of apparent typosquatting with 
redirection to parking services, and one case of phishing. Additionally, we 
identified 22 cases of defensive registrations, which either have been abused 
previously and then seized, or the current owner have deemed is so likely to 
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be registered for abuse that it is worth acquiring. In either case, it supports 
that our heuristic is suitable for identifying relevant domains.  
Considering that manual analysis of a domain takes a few minutes, we are 
able to identify five cases of abuse (and 22 defensive registrations) by 
investing about a half a working day (78 domains at 3 minutes per domains 
≈ 4 hours). We hypothesize that if the entire procedure is applied to a larger 
set of domains, while the number of top-ranked domains subjected to 
manual vetting  is kept fixed, the number of identified abusive domains is 
expected to be even better. This is based on the assumption that the expected 
prevalence of abuse increases with higher relative ranks, and the fact that 
with a larger set of domains the top-N (with fixed N) will correspond to a 
relatively smaller part of all the domains. This naturally prompts for 
validation through studies on larger scale, such as the entire .dk domain, in 
order to support or dismiss the hypothesis. 
In our study, the heuristic for abusive re-registrations fails to capture any 
abuse. This can be because the manual vetting process fails to discover 
present abuse, or because abusive re-registration does not occur for the .dk 
zone. Another more likely explanation is that the data set is too small and 
therefore does not contain abuse. Among the 10.000 domains observed for 
66 days, we only observed 3 re-registrations. No abusive re-registrations can 
be expected from such a small set. To evaluate this heuristic the data set 
must be extended, which can be done by including more domains and by 
observing for a longer period of time. Extrapolating the observed frequency 
of re-registrations to the 1.3 million domains in .dk, 390 re-registrations can 
be expected to occur in a 66 days period. While the ratio of abusive re-
registrations is not known, 390 re-registrations still appear to be a low count, 
so expanding the observation period also appears necessary. Alternatively, 
evaluation can be extended to more or larger TLDs. 
The heuristic for entropy also fails to yield any domains applying domain 
flux in the top-50, with one apparently irrelevant exception (A domain 
abused and seized prior to our observations, with a human readable label 
that did not appear pseudo random, i.e. apparently not from a DGA). Like 
for re-registrations, this can be explained by errors in the manual vetting 
process or by the evaluation data not containing examples of DGA domain. 
We are inclined to rule out errors in the vetting process, as DGA domains 
are expected to clearly stand out simply by the pseudo randomness apparent 
from the label, see for instance Schiavoni et al., (2014). It is possible that 
there are no cases of domain flux in the data, or perhaps even in the .dk 
zone. The price of registering a .dk domain, the registration process, which 
involves a process for registrant identity validation, the legal requirement 
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for public whois, and other specifics of the .dk might divert certain forms of 
abuse to other TLDs. It is also possible that criminals have improved their 
DGAs to be more stealth. This appears to be possible by generating domains 
that are closer to legitimate domains in some lexical sense, such as character 
or N-gram distributions, or simply by combining random words. In this 
case, a new heuristic must be devised. As per Section 3 this prompt for a 
study of the novel techniques, if such exist, which would merely be 
guesswork without examples. 
Section 3 omits heuristics for some of the techniques that was discussed in 
Section 2 This is so because we believe the techniques to be relevant for 
designing heuristics, but we have not been able to devise heuristics for these 
techniques given that available data. As described, Fast Flux exploits rapid 
changing A records on the authoritative nameserver, which is chosen by the 
registrant and not operated by the registry, therefore we do not have access 
to the master data. The nameserver operators are likely bound by 
confidentiality to their client, the registrant, and are perhaps also 
accomplices to abuse. Possible approaches to overcome this are passive 
DNS traffic monitoring and active probing. In the case of bulk registrations, 
practical limitations lead us to select a subset of domains for observation, as 
described in Section  3 , which lead to our data not providing insights on this 
technique. The solution, which is in development, is to monitor the entire 
.dk zone, including new registrations. 
 
 6  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Having demonstrated that the approach of analysing abuse techniques, 
devising heuristics, ranking domains, and manually vetting the domains 
ranked as most likely to be abusive is valid, at least for the used data set and 
some of the techniques considered, we would like to expand the study to 
obtain more general results. The most obvious first step is to analyse the 
entire .dk zone, as the limited number of domains is a recurring issue, as 
evident from the above discussion. This implies some practical challenges 
that we are currently working on. Similarly, expanding the duration of the 
observation is relevant, and this is more straightforward.  Extending to other 
TLDs is also a possibility, but this is subject to the details available in the 
data. As registries and TLDs differ, the current heuristics might not apply, 
but this only means that it is a possibility to evaluate our entire approach, 
including the analysis of abuse techniques. 
Some techniques are presumably not evident in the WHOIS data, as 
discussed above, so passive DNS traffic monitoring and active probing of 
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recursive name servers are under consideration as data sources for further 
studies. Specifically, we are currently investigating the OpenINTEL 
frameworkviii, which can enable heuristics for the Fast Flux techniques and 
more. 
In general, we still see domain names as an essential link between the 
physical and cyber realms, which is enabling for the majority of both 
legitimate and criminal activity involving cyber, and therefore a key point 
for attacking the criminal activity which evidently persists.  
 
 7  CONCLUSION 
We have described the extent of cybercriminal business and surveyed the 
abusive schemes and techniques that employ domain names to enable the 
crime, but also make domain names and the Domain Name System a choke 
point for combatting cybercrime. We have proposed an approach of defining 
heuristics for abusive domain names, based on the abusive techniques, and 
present a set of such heuristics. We have demonstrated that our heuristics 
can be applied to focus manual effort, allowing us to identify five abusive 
domains among 10.000, with four hours of manual effort. Specifically, we 
extracted 36 .dk 2LDs automatically with a heuristic based on matching .dk 
2LD labels to 2LD labels of the Alexa top 1 million, in combination with 
WHOIS information on domain state. Through a manual vetting process, 
two of the 36 were identified as positive cases of abuse. Another heuristic 
based on editing distances between FQDNs from .dk and FQDNs from 
Alexa was used to obtain a top 50 of most similar FQDNs. These pairs 
represent 42 interesting domains, which was also subjected to manual 
vetting, and three was found to be active typosquatting of a malicious 
nature. Among the 50 pairs we also found 22 examples of defensive 
registrations and one seized typosquatting domain. A heuristic based on 
reregistration was proposed, but results were inconclusive as the data only 
holds a total of three reregistration. Expanding the data with more domains 
and a longer observation can possibly improve on this. A heuristic based 
entropy was applied, but no abuse was identified among the top 50 of 
heuristically ranked domains, either because the heuristic fails or because 
the targeted technique is uncommon in the .dk zone. In summary, we have 
contributed by detailing our efficient heuristic approach, and by providing 
the first scientific study on abuse in the .dk country code Top-Level 
Domain.  
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KEY TERMS 
 
DNS: Domain Names System. A distributed, hierarchical database of, 
among other things, mappings from human readable domain names to 
machine readable IP addresses.  
Domain Name: A string that identifies an autonomous subset of the Internet 
typically corresponding to a personal or organisational entity.  
Abuse: Use that violates accepted terms, applicable law, or the non-
conflicting interest of non-criminal users of the Internet. 
Heuristics: Practical and applicable methods that are not necessarily 
optimal, perfect, or theoretically derived. 
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